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RAYMorm 0. CLuTTER [Ed.]
NECESSITY FOR OBSERVING COMMON LAW DISTINCTION BETWEEN
LARCENY AND OBTAINING BY FALSE PRETENSES UNDER MODERN
STATUTES (WISCONSIN)
In Whitmore v. State,1 upon delivery of
a worthless check'as down payment the
defendant was placed in possession of an
automobile sold under a conditional sales
contract; by the terms of the contract, title
was reserved in the vendor until the full
purchase price was paid. The defendant
was charged and convicted of the statutory
offense of obtaining money by false pretenses. On appeal it was contended that
reservation of title in the vendor precluded a conviction for obtaining money
by false pretenses, as both title to and
possession of the property must have been
obtained in order to constitute that offense, and that the offense committed, if
any, was that of larceny by trick. The
court, however, held that as the legal title
was retained by the vendor for purposes
of security only, the property interest obtained by the defendant was sufficient to
support the conviction.
The defendant's contention that he could
not properly be convicted of the offense
of obtaining by false pretenses was not
based upon a specific requirement in the
statute that title pass, 2 but rather upon the
common-law distinction between the offense of larceny by trick and that of obtaining money by false pretenses. The

doctrine of larceny by trick was first suggested in 1779 in Rex v. Pear,3 the court
holding that where by false pretenses the
representor induced the representee to
part with possession only, the representor
was guilty of larceny. In as much as a
statute adopted in 17574 had laid down the
broad modern law of false pretenses, it
would seem that the court in Pear's Case
would have convicted the defendant of
that offense, and in fact the application
of the statut6 was urged by four dissenting judges. However, there was a distinction between the ordinary pretense
situation and the situation in Pear's Case.
In the former the person who was deceived intended to part with title, while
in the latter he intended to part only with
possession. -This distinction, based on intention, was suggested by Eyre, B., alone,
but it was immediately accepted by the
courts, and has since been applied in innumerable instances.
The American courts, however, have not
unanimously adopted the view that the
intent of the defrauded party to pass title
at the time of the transfer of possession
is the determining factor in distinguishing
between the offenses, although there is
considerable authority to that effect. 5 In

298 N. W. 194 (Wis. 1941).
Wisconsin Stats. (1939) §343.25. "Any person
who shall designedly, by any false pretenses
or by any privy or false token and with intent
to defraud, obtain from any 'other person any
money, goods, wares, merchandise, or other
property, . . . shall . . . be punished by
imprisonment."
3 2 East P. C. 685; 1 Leach (4th ed.) 212.
4 30 Geo. U1,Chap. 24. This statute made the

obtaining of goods by false pretenses punishable
as a misdemeanor.
5 "If the possession has been obtained by
fraud, trick, or. other device, and the owner of
it intends to part with his title when he gives
up possession, the offense, if any, is obtaining
money by false pretenses." People v. Tomlinson,
102 Cal. 23, 36 P. 506 (1894) (italics supplied).
See also State v. Loser, 132 Ia. 419, 104 N. W. 337
(1906).
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several states it has rather been held that
the true test is whether title actually
passed to the representor as a matter of
law.6 The distinction is a fine one, and the
courts have frequently encountered difficulty in observing it. There have been instances in which the court, after correctly
stating the rule to be followed, clearly
erred in its application of the rule to the
particular situation. For instance, where
an agent fraudulently purports to borrow
for a non-existent principal, the offense
has been held to be obtaining by false
pretenses and not larceny by trick, although obviously there is neither an actual
passing of title nor any intent to pass title
to the representor, the intent rather being
to pass title to the non-existent principal.7
Again, there are instances where there
may be a delivery of goods with the intent
to pass title but for some reason no sale
is effected, and yet it is held that no crime
of obtaining by false pretenses is committed.8 The consequence of the observance
of the distinction by the courts is apparent; there are conceivably many instances where a defendant guilty of theft
in some form must either receive a new
trial or go free solely because the nature
of his theft has not properly been set forth
in the indictment.
Considering, then, the consequence of
the application by the courts of the common-law distinction between these offenses, it is to be regretted that under
existing statutes the distinction must still
be observed in two-thirds of the states.
The statutes in this field may in general
be classified in the following manner: The
majority of states have adopted statutes

comparable to that of Wisconsin, 9 and
make larceny and obtaining by false pretenses separate offenses as at commonlaw. This of course necessitates the observance of the common-law distinction,
that is, the distinction between the actual
passing of title and the intent to pass title,
in framing an indictment. Several states
have attempted to remedy the situation by
abolishing any distinction between the offenses as far as the form of the indictment
is concerned, the offenses being consolidated into the one general offense of
larceny. The New York statute is an example of this type. 10 But these states neglected to change the methods of pleading
and proof employed at common law in
establishing the offenses, and for that reason the attempt has failed. The distinction
must still be observed in pleading; that
is, proof of facts constituting common-law
larceny by trick will not sustain an indictment for larceny setting forth facts constituting the offense of obtaining by false
pretenses, and vice versa.1 '
The remaining states have attempted to
avoid this difficulty by various means.
The Ohio statute provides that an indictment may contain counts for larceny and
for obtaining by false pretenses, and the
jury may find the defendant guilty of
either offense.12 Arkansas keeps the offenses separate, but then provides that if
under an indictment for obtaining by false
pretenses it is proved that the defendant
obtained the property in such a manner
as to amount to larceny, he is not entitled
to an acquittal but shall be convicted as
though the offense had been proved as
charged.13 Massachusetts consolidates the

6 "That principle that, so long as the defrauded
party retains either title or control over the
property, the crime of obtaining is not consummated, has general support both in reason and
authority." Bates v. State, 124 Wis. 612, 103 N. W.
251 (1905). See also State v. Burke, 189 Wis. 641,
207 N. W. 251 (1926). There has been considerable discussion as to which rule is better founded
in reason and authority and should for that reason be adopted by all the courts as the sole test.
See Note (1924) 9 Iowa L. B. 204, 209: "It has
been held, however, in other states, and it is
submitted, correctly, that the true test for distinguishing between larceny by trick and obtaining property by false pretenses, is whether or
not, at a matter of law, the defendant received
a property interest in the goods involved."
7Lewer v. Commonwealth (Pa. 1827), 15 S.&

R1.93. See also Beale, The Borderland of Larceny
(1892), 6 Harv. L. Rev. 244. Professor Beale cites
several instances of convictions for obtaining by
false pretenses where title did not pass, and
other instances of convictions for larceny by
trick where title did pass.
8 In People v. Camp, 56 Mlich. 548, 23 N. W. 216
(1885), goods were fraudulently obtained from
one who had no power to sell; the court held that
the offense committed was not that of obtaining
by false pretenses.
9 See note 2, supra.
'ON. Y. Penal Code (Gilbert 1940) §1290.
" See People v. Dumar, 106 N. Y. 502, 13 N. E.
325 (1887).
12 Ohio Code Ann. (Page 1939), §13437-23.
'3 Arkansas Stats. (Pope 1937), §§3073, 3075.

CRIMINAL CASES
offenses, the same as New York, but further to support a conviction'of obtaining money
provides that an indictment for the gen- by false pretenses," and again that "the
eral offense of larceny is sustained by doctrine that one must obtain title and
proof that the defendant committed either possession in order to be guilty of the
or that of obtaining crime of false pretenses cannot mean an
the offense of larceny
4
absolute title because any title obtained
by false pretenses.
The statutes of twenty-eight of the by fraud is-voidable and the requirement
states are similar to those of Wisconsin would make it impossible for the crime
and New York; these statutes perpetuate to be consummated."''
the existence of a distinction the applicaThe situation is one that may be
tion of which constitutes a definite impedi- remedied by appropriate legislation. The
ment to the administration of justice. The statutes adopted by Ohio and Arkansas
need for statutory reform is apparent. The have achieved this result,16 but the simmajority of the legislatures of the states plest remedy and the one which offers the
have either been blind or indifferent as fullest protection for the rights of the deregards the situation or their attempts to fendant is that of Massachusetts.' 7 The
remedy it have proved inadequate, and in right of the defendant to have sufficient
order to attain a just result under such knowledge of the exact accusation made
statutes the courts have been forced to against him in the indictment is adequately
protected by a provision giving him the
make technical and narrow distinctionsto strain in their application of law and right to demand the state to file a bill of
fact in order to support the offense particulars.' 8 Thus individual rights are
charged in the indictment. Thus we find fully protected and the possibility of the
the court in the instant case holding that defendant being given a new trial or set
"where goods are sold under a conditional free because his theft has not properly
sales contract and the legal title is merely been set forth in the indictment is elimiretained for purposes of security, the nated.
THoMAs H. Cyn.-sas.
vendee gets a sufficient property interest
14 Mass. Laws Ann. (1932), Chap. 266, §30;
Chap. 277, §4
,5Whitmore v. State, cited supra note 1, at
p. 195.

See notes 12 and 13, supra.
See note 14, supra.
18 Mass. Laws Ann. (1932) Chap. 277, §40.
16
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CONSPIRACY UNDER THE LINDBERGH KIDNAPPING LAW (FEDERAL)

viously been convicted of having conspired
with others in the State of Minnesota to2
violate the Lindbergh Kidnapping Law.
The facts are as follows: Edward George
Bremer was seized at St. Paul, Minnesota,
by certain of the conspirators and transported to their hideout in the State of
Illinois. It was agreed that they would

hold him for a ransom of $200,000. To
avoid discovery and arrest and to the end
that they might safely enjoy the profits
and fruits of their crime they agreed to
convert the ransom money into other currency at various places deemed by them
to be propitious for that purpose. There
was no evidence of the defendant's having
been bodily present within the State of
Minnesota during or after the time the
alleged offense was committed, but, on the
contrary, he did not acquire knowledge of
the conspiracy and its unlawful purpose
until some four monfhs after the ransom

1 IM F. (2d) 962 (C. C. A. 10th, 1941).
247 Stat. 326 (1932). In 1934 this act was
amended. The taking of a minor by a parent was
specifically excepted, the penalty was increased,
and a proviso was inserted creating a presump-

tion that a person has been transported in interstate or foreign commerce if he or she has not
been released within seven days after having
been unlawfully kidnapped. 48 Stat. 781 (1934),
18 USCA §408a (Supp. 1940).

In Hudspeth, Warden v. McDonald' the
Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit,
reversed the decision of the District Court
for the District of Kansas which had released the defendant, McDonald, on a writ
of habeas corpus. McDonald had pre-
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money was paid and Bremer released.
He came into the case for the sole purpose of exchanging the marked ransom
money for unmarked money in consideration of a 25 per-cent commission.3 The defendant was found guilty of having "conspired to kidnap in interstate commerce"
and was sentenced to the penitentiary for
fifteen years by the District Court for the
District of Minnesota.
In upholding the conviction of McDonald
the court was faced with two perplexing
problems, viz.: (a) Was the defendant a
member of the conspiracy to kidnap in
interstate commerce; (b) was the defendant subject to the jurisdiction of the
Minnesota District Court?
The Lindbergh Law contained two substantive provisions: (1) It penalized kidnapping in interstate commerce; (2) it
penalized conspiracy to kidnap in interstate commerce. A careful analysis of the
statute would seem to require the conclusion that only those acts actually concerned with movement or transportation
in interstate commerce are prohibited.5
The material part of the statute follows:
"Whoever shall knowingly transport or
cause to be transported, or aid or abet in
transporting, in interstate or foreign commerce, any person . . . and held for ransom. . ."0 shall be punished.
The defendant sought release on the
theory that the District Court of Minnesota had no jurisdiction of the offense
charged against him in the indictment because the conspiracy to kidnap in interstate commerce, if any, was fully consummated upon the payment of the ransom
3 It is estimated that there are from eight to
twenty individuals connected with the average
kidnapping--from the "finger" man down to the
disposer of the "hot" money, if a ransom is paid.
4See 89 F. (2d) 128 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937).
5 It would seem that McDonald was not indictable for either of these two substantive provisions, because the victim of the kidnapping
had been released on February 6, 1934, and his
knowledge of the crime and his acts occurred
subsequent to the payment and release of the
victim. It would also seem that the kidnapping
in interstate commerce terminated with the release of Bremer after payment of the ransom
money. At that identical moment the conspiracy
to kidnap in interstate commerce had been
finally consummated.
6 See supra, note 2.

money and the release of Bremer on
February 6, 1934, and his acts, if any,
occurring subsequent to such date, are not
within the denouncement of the statute on
which he was indicted, tried and convicted. 7
The court was forced to do a neat bit
of judicial juggling to apply the Lindbergh
Law to the factual situation. The movement in interstate commerce concept received very little emphasis by the court.
Major emphasis was placed on determining the consummation of the criminal conspiracy. This appears to be the criterion
of the court rather than the commerce
clause.8 The legalistic language of the
court in disposing of the first question
propounded, reiterated a settled rule of
law that a criminal conspiracy, once
formed, continues till the object for which
it was formed has been accomplished."
The court in determining when the object
of the conspiracy has been accomplished
seems to have tested it as being a question of fact to be resolved by common
sense, and experience. Parts of the opinion
are perhaps worthy of quotation: "the
conspiracy charged in the indictment haa
its inception in the agreement to kidnap
Bremer but it did not end with the payment of the ransom and his release. The
exchange of the ransom money for other
currency was as much a part of the conspiracy as was the kidnapping of Bremer.
The object of this type of conspiracy is
to get possession of unmarked money
which may be used with safety. It begins
with the plan to abduct and ends when
the ransom money is changed into unmarked currency.
7 The District Court for the District of Kansas
released the defendant on a habeas corpus proceeding.
8 For an excellent discussion on this problem
see: Fisher and McGuire, Kidnapping and the
So-Called Lindbergh Law (1940) 28 Geo. L. J.
903.
9 See supra, note 4. The court in attempting to
formulate a general rule as to when a continuing
criminal conspiracy is at an end said: "Whenever
the unlawfulobject of the conspiracyhas reached
that stage of consummation, whereat the several

conspirators having taken in spendable form
their several agreed parts of the spoils, may go

their several ways, without the necessity of
further acts or consultation, about the conspiracy, with each other or among themselves,
the conspiracy has ended."
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"Nor does the jurisdiction of the District
Court of Minnesota to try the defendant
depend upon whether he was a member
of the conspiracy from its inception. If,
after the ransom money was paid and
Bremer released, appellee with full knowledge of the conspiracy and its unlawful
purpose, agreed to exchange the ransom
money for other money, he thereby became a party to it with the same effect
as if he had joined it at its inception."
A review of some of the cases, relied
upon by the court is essential to an understanding of the rationale of what courts
0
have done under the commerce clause.'
1
In Skelly v. United States ' the accused
was not a party to the original conspiracy
but only came into it after payment of
the ransom and the release of the victim
and took part in exchanging marked ransom money for unmarked money. Skelly
was indicted, tried and convicted for conspiracy to kidnap in interstate commerce in
violation of the Lindbergh Law. The court
found that the defendant was an accessory
after the fact and therefore guilty of the
conspiracy.' 2 The court indicated that the
criminal agreement had two purposes
which constituted one entire conspiracy,
the commission of the substantive offense
by principals and the commission of accessory criminal acts by "accessories after
the fact." The court has shown a willingness to apply the broader interpretation
of commerce to criminal cases in holding
that both purposes are embraced within
the conspiracy provision of the act and
that such conspiracy was not completed
until both its objects were effected.
Analysis reveals the very strained construction employed by the court in. order

to apply the "accessory after the fact"
concept. 3
In Lew Moy v. United States,14 the defendants were convicted on an indictment
which charged a conspiracy to import
Chinese into the United States contrary
to an existing statute. In that case the
court said that the conspiracy did not end
the instant the Chinese whose illegal entry
was procured and facilitated were brought
across the international boundary. A successful consummation required the necessity to evade the immigration officials.
The court concluded that the subsequent
assistance by defendants to transport the
Chinese into the interior and conceal their
identity was an essential-part of the unlawful project bringing the defendants
5
within the intendment of the statute.'
As recently articulated, the legislative
policy behind the act contemplates and
seeks to bring about punishment of all
individuals who knowingly associate
themselves with the conspirators; and it
is intended to be interpreted to reach all
who coalesce to achieve any object prohibited by the act.' It is submitted that
the courts in seeking to determine when
the conspiracy in interstate commerce
terminates, evolves the theory that the
conspiracy comprises inseparable elements
that are inextricably interwoven to comprise a single scheme, the individual parts
of which are incapable of division or separation. Decisions of the federal courts
involving interpretations of the law reveal
a consistent tendency to sustain prosecutions under the law. 1" Whether the commerce clause has been abandoned or enlarged depends on the interpretation
given to it by the courts. Words, as we are
told, "are flexible."

14 237 F. 50 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916).
1o For an illuminating discussion on this prob15 Accord: Lasky v. United States, 82 F. (2d)
lem see: Finley, The Lindbergh Law (1935) 12
672 (C. C. A. 10th, 1936). Shannon v. United
N. Y. U. L. Q. 646.
States, 76 F. (2d) 490 (C. C. A. 10th, 1935). These
11 76 F. (2d) 483 (C. C. A. 10th, 1935).
are but a few of the examples that might here
12 There is no definition in the statute of an
be adduced.
"accessory after the fact to the crime of con16 See hearings before Committee on the
spiracy."
Judiciary on H. R. 5657, 72d Congress; 1st Sess.
(The incensed people's representatives in the
'3 There is no federal legislation satisfactorily
defining an "accessory after the fact." At com- House deliberating upon the Lindbergh Law
mon law an accessory after the fact is one who, were vindictive.) See Note, 26 J. Crim. L. 762
(1936).
knowing a felony to have been committed, re'7 Cf. Lee v. United States, 106 F. (2d) 906
ceives, relieves, comforts, or assists the felon in
(C. C. A. 9th, 1939); France v. United States, 164
order to hinder the felon's apprehension, trial,
or punishment. 4 Blackstone, Commentaries 37. U. S. 676 (1896).
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After deciding that McDonald became
a party to the conspiracy with the same
effect as if he had joined it at its inception, the court in the concept of "constructive presence" found jurisdiction. This is
not a new doctrine in the law. It is a
settled rule of law that a member of a
conspiracy can be constructively present
by virtue of the acts of his co-conspirators.'8 The court relied upon the language
of four United States Supreme Court decisions in holding that a party defendant
may be constructively present in a state
in which a crime is being or has been
committed, as well as if he were actually
present therein.19
One of the main arguments against the
concept of "constructive presence" is that
it is a transgression of the requirement of
the Constitution that the trial of crimes
shall be held in the State and district
where the crime shall be committed.20
Mr. Justice Holmes in his dissenting opinion in the Hyde case 21 pointed out serious
objections to the use of the fiction of constructive presence. The use of a fictibn
hinders precise analysis. His logical reasoning is that although an overt act is
necessary to complete the offense, it is in
fact no part of the conspiracy. 22 Therefore it ought not to be said that an overt
act constituting no part of the crime
charged, should have any bearing in determining jurisdiction. Otherwise, if a
conspiracy is present wherever an overt
act is done it may be at the choice of the
government to prosecute in any one of
of which the contwenty States in none
23
spirators had been.
It is submitted that in view of the
present day need for an efficient weapon
to combat organized crime it is more
suitable, in order to facilitate the administration of criminal justice, to take the
conspirators from their homes and hide18 Easterday v. McCarthy, 256 F. 651 (C. C. A.
2d, 1919).
19 Hyde v. United States, 225 U. S. 347 (1911);
Brown v. Elliott, 225 U. S. 392 (1911); Price v.
Henkel, 216 U. S. 488 (1909); Burton v. United
States, 202 U. S. 344 (1905).
20U . S. Const. Amend. IV.
21 See Mr. Justice Holmes dissenting opinion,
Hyde v. United States, supra, note 19. This was
a 5-4 decision.

outs, guaranteeing them a fair trial, rather
than subjecting the prosecuting witnesses
to the inconvenience and financial loss
that would result from traveling long
distances in order to be available for the
trial.
Another argument that has been offered
but which seemingly has little merit is
the possibility that a conspirator may be
convicted of the same offense in each and
every other state where other acts were
committed as well as in the state where
the conspiracy was originally formed.
The answer to this argument emanates
from the fact that in a prosecution for
conspiracy, venue may be laid either in
the district where the illegal agreement
was formed or in any district where an
overt act was committed. 24 The crime of
conspiracy is a continuing one and the
overt act in each state constitutes a distinct offense separably indictable and
punishable.
It is interesting to note that Congress,
in 1936, passed another amendment designed to reach persons who knowingly
handled ransom money in connection with
a violation of the kidnapping act.25 It is
to be questioned whether this amendment
will be taken advantage of by the government in future situations presented by the
McDonald case. The results reached by
the courts under the conspiracy clause
have included persons who knowingly
handled ransom money in connection with
a violation of the kidnapping act, thus
threatening the perpetrators of this type
of crime with swift, certain and heavyhanded punishment. Perhaps the amendment will be of value in cases more doubtful than this one. At any rate it is a
further safeguard and assurance that kidnapping is to be reduced to a minimum in
this country.
KENNETH L. HEcHT.
v. United States, supra, note 15.
See Note, 24 J. Crim. L. 779, 781 (1933), as
to "double jeopardy."
24 Chew v. United States, 9 F. (2d) 348 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1925).
25 49 Stat. 1099 (1936), 18 USCA 408c-1 (Supp.
1940). Punishment is limited to a fine of $10,000
or imprisonment in the penitentiary for 10 years,
or both.
22Lasky
23

